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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
JONES' FOCUS ON UTAH PROBATE LAW ERRONEOUSLY 
IGNORES AND FAILS TO REFUTE THE CONFLICT OF 
LAWS ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT 
While Appellee Robert Lee Jones (hereinafter Jones) correctly 
states that Utah statues take precedence over Utah common law, the 
Utah Probate Code does not contain any section dealing with 
conflicts of laws issues between states. Nor is there extant any 
codification of conflict of laws which therefore remains controlled 
by common law. 
The "Conflict of laws" in the present case arises because the 
former Utah statute regarding pretermitted children, differs 
greatly from the corresponding California statute. Former Utah 
Code Ann. §75-2-302(1)(a) provided as follows: 
(1) If a testator fails to provide in his will for any of 
his children or issue of a deceased child, the omitted child 
or issue receives a share in the estate equal in value to that 
which he would have received if the testator had died 
intestate unless: 
(a) It appears from the will that the omission was 
intentional. 
Unlike the old Utah Provision, Calif. Code § 6570 restricts 
the finding of a pretermitted child to children born or adopted 
after execution of the subject will: 
Except as provided in Section 6671, if a testator fails 
to provide in his or her will for a child of the testator born 
or adopted after the execution of the will, the omitted child 
shall receive a share in the estate equal in value to that 
which the child would have received if the testator had died 
intestate. (Emphasis added) 
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 Utah Code Ann. §75-2-302 dealing with pretermitted children 
has been amended to agree with the corresponding California 
provision. 
Appellant Personal Representative Linda Anglesey (hereinafter 
Anglesey) has presented an impressive amount of case law, from the 
United States Supreme Court on down, holding specifically that 
where real property is owned by a deceased in a state other than 
their domicile, it is the law of the situs state which controls the 
disposition of said property. See additionally Matter of Estate of 
Reed, 664 P.2d 824, 831 (Kan. 1983); In Re Estate of Swanson, 397 
So.2d 465, 466 (Fla. App. 1981); West v. White, 758 P.2d 424, 426 
(Or. App. 1988). In fact where a "will devises land in more than 
one state, the courts in each state will construe it as to the 
lands located therein as if devised by separate wills". Swanson 
Supra (quoting Trotter v. VanPelt, 144 Fla. 517, 522, 198 So. 215, 
217, (1940)). 
Jones, on the other hand, has presented the court with no case 
law, nor statute for that matter, to the contrary. Jones' only 
attempt to deal with the unanimity of the courts' decisions on this 
issue is the misinterpretation of one case cited by Anglesey and 
brief references to case law and a Restatement section which are 
not relevant to said issue. 
Jones' conclusion that In re Rays Estate, 287 P.2d 692 (Wyo. 
1955), cited by Anglesey in her Appellant's Brief, "implicitly 
recognized the Nevada court's finding that the son was a 
pretermitted child", is completely erroneous. In fact, the Wyoming 
court found that the question of whether the son was pretermitted 
was irrelevant under Wyoming law which provides that "a testator is 
free to bestow his bounty upon those whom he wishes," and refused 
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to "engraft on the law of the (State of Wyoming) a statutory 
provision of another, which we do not have." Jd. at 635. 
The case of Estate of Duauesne, 29 Utah 2d 94, 505 P.2d 779 
(1973) cited by Jones deals with a completely different set of 
facts and issues than the case at bar. This Court, in Duquesne, 
applied the same body of conflicts of law, common law, which Jones 
earlier denounced, in finding that the issue of the legitimacy of 
a child is a question of "status" and not "situs" and is therefore 
determined by the laws of the domicile state. Id., at 781. 
Although this Court goes on to say that such is the law in an 
overwhelming majority of jurisdictions, at no point is the issue in 
the case at bar discussed. 
The case of Andre v. Morrow, 680 P.2d 1355 (Idaho 1984) cited 
by Jones goes even further into the realm of irrelevancy. While 
Andre, a fraud case, does affirm the rule that "the courts of one 
state cannot directly affect title to realty located in another 
state," Id. at 1365, there are no conflicts of laws issues 
discussed, nor issues involving pretermitted children or ancillary 
probate proceedings. The case is simply inapplicable. 
The obscure comment to the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts 
of Law, §236 also cited by Jones is, again, unpersuasive. First of 
all, Jones can point to no case law or jurisdiction which has 
followed such a position and secondly, such a coercive use of 
judicial power by way of personal jurisdiction over parties was 
exactly the situation warned against in Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U.S. 
186, 20 S.Ct. 873, 44 L.Ed 1028 (1900) and its long progeny as 
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discussed in Anglesey's Appellant's Brief. It is significant to 
note at this point as well that Jones failed or refused to even 
address the Clarke case and its holding. Moreover, said comment to 
the Restatement requires that the deceased and all heirs be 
domiciled in the same state, which is not the case in the matter 
before the Court. 
POINT II 
IT IS INAPPROPRIATE FOR JONES TO ARGUE 
QUESTIONS OF FACT OR THE PROPRIETY OF THE 
CALIFORNIA RULING IN THIS PROCEEDING 
A. The Utah Court of Appeals Did Not Rule That "The Testator 
Did Not Intend to Omit His Son." 
Jones' Statement of Facts makes the representation that the 
holding in the prior appeal before the Utah Court of Appeals 
(Estate of Herbert Lee Jones v. Jones, 459 P.2d 345 (1988)) 
included a finding that the Testator did not intend to omit his 
son, Robert Lee Jones, from his will. (Appellee's Brief, pg. 10, 
last paragraph). Said statement, however, is both false and 
misleading. While it is true that the Appeals Court did hold that 
Jones was a pretermitted child, said holding was based exclusively 
on former Utah Code Ann §75-2-302(1) which prohibited the trial 
court from looking at extrinsic evidence to determine whether a 
child was intentionally omitted from a will. Id. at 349. Such 
distinction is important because the California court could not 
have relied on the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals in any 
event, as suggested by Jones, and was required to hold its own 
trial to determine that Jones was intentionally omitted from his 
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father's will. 
B. The California Court Decision Was Based Upon California 
Law and the California Court's Findings at Trial 
Beside the fact that it is presumptuous of Jones to speculate 
on the decision making process used by the California court, it is 
clear from the record available that the Judge was unwilling to 
base his decision on Utah law or a prior Utah court decision. For 
this reason the Judge required the presentation of evidence 
regarding the omission of Jones from his father's will and based 
his decision on said evidence and California law. (R. at 530-538) 
Had Jones bothered to appear or object during said ancillary 
proceeding, it is obvious that he would have had an opportunity to 
present evidence on his own behalf. As Jones elected not to appear 
in said proceeding, he is estopped from now complaining about how 
it was conducted and speculate on the basis of the Court's 
decision. 
C. Jones May Not Argue Disputed Facts Where the Trial Court 
Ruled as a Matter of Law. 
The trial court herein ruled as a matter of law, after hearing 
only, that the California court decision was "wholly invalid". (R. 
at 550-552), Jones now wishes to argue that the decision of the 
California Court was procured by fraud on the part of Anglesey. 
First of all, such is not the case and was disputed vehemently by 
Anglesey at hearing. (R. at 480-485). Secondly, any question of 
fraud must be resolved in the appropriate forum, before the 
California court. Third, the California court was not interested 
in the Utah proceedings or Utah Law, and finally all facts disputed 
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at hearing must be considered in the light most favorable to the 
Appellant Anglesey. Moreover, as pointed out above, Jones has 
forfeited any right to dispute the California court decision and is 
estopped therefrom. Jones7 attempt to argue said facts, therefore, 
is inappropriate. 
D. Anglesey is Not Estopped From Denvincr That Jones is a 
Pretermitted Heir in California. 
Jones' contention that because the issue of California law was 
not raised in the initial trial before the Utah Third District 
court, Anglesey is estopped from raising it in the California 
Ancillary proceeding is circular logic at its worst. The 
California law and real property issues were not litigated in Utah 
because Utah has no subject matter jurisdiction with regard 
thereto, and all parties were aware that an ancillary proceeding 
would be required to determine the disposition of California real 
property. 
Moreover, Anglesey's position throughout all proceedings has 
been completely consistent. She has always contended that Jones 
was intentionally disinherited, to which all triers of fact have 
agreed. And, once again, any such estoppel argument should have 
been made by Jones in the California proceeding and is irrelevant 
and inappropriate at this point. 
POINT III 
JUDICIAL ECONOMY WILL NOT BE EFFECTED 
BY THE COURT'S DECISION HEREIN 
Despite Jones' use of cliche's like "overcrowded court 
calendars" and "flood of proceedings", the law as set forth by 
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Anglesey is the current law in every jurisdiction which has decided 
this issue. It is already necessary to file an ancillary 
proceeding in every state a deceased owned real property and each 
state is allowed to scrutinize the subject will and award real 
property in accordance with its own laws. There will be no change 
or floodgate of litigation. 
The only policy question before the Court in fact, is whether 
Utah is willing to unilaterally throw away a good part of its 
sovereignty and the ability to control the disposition of real 
property located in this state. 
CONCLUSION 
Jones' attempt to rely on the provisions of the Utah Probate 
Code ignores the fact that said statutes are oft times in conflict 
with similar provisions in other states. It is the resolution of 
said conflict of laws that is the issue before the Court and which 
has been unanimously decided by all courts since the United States 
Supreme Court in 1900. The disposition of real property in a 
probate proceeding is determined by the laws of the situs state and 
not the deceased's domicile. 
Jones' further attempts to question the validity of the 
California court ruling regarding California real property are 
unsupported, untimely and inappropriate in this forum. Moreover, 
the Court should find in favor of Anglesey on policy reasons as 
well, to avoid the loss of Utah state sovereignty. 
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WHEREFORE, Anglesey prays for relief as set forth in her 
Appellant's Brief. 
Dated this ,/( day of September, 1992. 
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